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A B S T R A C T
Ecological economists aim to transform our economic institutions so that society can flourish within planetary
boundaries. The central message of this article is that private rent extraction forms a key barrier to the realisation
of that goal.
I define rent as an economic reward which is sustained through control of assets that cannot be quickly and
widely replicated, and which exceeds proportionate compensation for the labour of the recipient. I argue that
unless we close opportunities for rent extraction, and socialise unavoidable rents, our governments will be
compelled to pursue output growth, regardless of its environmental consequences, in order to prevent spiralling
inequality and unemployment.
The positive proposition in this article is that the concept of rent can help us to identify, and build democratic
support for, the institutional transformations necessary to prepare for a resource-constrained future. Measures to
reduce and redistribute rentier power could be emancipatory for the poorest in society, whilst making more
feasible many proposals that have been advocated already in this journal, including reduced working hours and
resource caps.
By contrast, if environmental protections are introduced before opportunities for private rent extraction are
closed, we could see intensified rent-seeking, asset price bubbles, poverty and economic insecurity.
1. Introduction
Over recent decades, analysts of diverse political persuasions have
noted a shift in investment patterns away from productive investment,
where returns are achieved through innovation and output growth,
toward non-productive investment, where returns are achieved by ex-
tracting economic rent. The rise of ‘rentier capitalism’ has been held
responsible for increasing inequality and financial instability
(Mazzucato, 2018; Standing, 2016; UNCTAD, 2017).
Despite an explicit concern for just distribution, there has been re-
latively little discussion of rising rent extraction among ecological
economists (Hardt and O'Neill, 2017; Rezai and Stagl, 2016), perhaps
because the redirection of capital from rent-seeking to productive in-
vestment is likely, in the absence of tough environmental protections, to
result in higher rates of resource consumption.
This article is partly an appeal for ecological economists to take
seriously the threat posed by continued rent extraction and rent-seeking
to our aspiration for ‘a good life for all within planetary boundaries’
(O'Neill et al., 2018). I argue that if we try to impose environmental
protections without first closing down opportunities for rent extraction,
we are likely to experience increasing inequality and financial in-
stability. Further, I argue that concentrations of rentier power, and
certain forms of rent-seeking, create a ‘political growth imperative’
(Richters and Siemoneit, 2019) whereby governments are compelled to
pursue output growth, regardless of its environmental consequences, in
order to prevent debt, poverty and unemployment from becoming po-
litically destabilising.
The positive proposition in this article is that the concept of rent can
be used to identify and build democratic support for the economic
transformations necessary to prepare for a resource-constrained future.
The concept of rent allows us to challenge the social efficacy and moral
legitimacy of payments delivered through market exchange, without
necessarily rejecting any role for markets (Frayssé, 2015, p. 176).
Measures to reduce and redistribute rents could be emancipatory for
millions of people, and make more feasible key proposals that have
been advocated in this journal, including reduced working hours
(Zwickl et al., 2016) and resource caps (Alcott, 2010; Boyce, 2018).
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2, I offer an
introduction to ‘rent theory Lockeanism’, which informs my definitions
of rent, rent-seeking and rentier power. In Section 3, I discuss the way
that environmental protections could directly and indirectly influence
the mobilisation of rentier power, and outline some likely consequences
for society. In Section 4, I propose that there is a paradox in the re-
lationship between rent and growth. On the one hand, widespread
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opportunities for rent extraction can dampen prospects for economic
growth. On the other hand, rent-seeking and rent extraction create a
systemic growth dependency. In Section 5, I draw out the implications
of the analysis in the preceding sections for ecological macroeconomics
and the task of redesigning our economy for a finite planet. In Section 6,
I reflect on the potential strategic advantages of delegitimising and
diffusing rentier power, compared to relying on minimum and max-
imum incomes, and wealth caps, to limit inequality. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2. The concept of economic rents
2.1. Rent theory Lockeanism
I follow those writers from classical, institutional, post-Keynesian
and socialist traditions who have used the term ‘rent’ to denote eco-
nomic rewards which are analogous to the land rents or ground rents
captured by hereditary landowners. Such ground rents patently bear no
relation to labour or sacrifice on the part of the landlord and thus lack
any rights-based Lockean justification, as Smith (1843 [1776], bk. 1, ch
XI, part 1), Ricardo (1817, chap. 2) and Mill (1885, pp. 629–630) all
acknowledged.
For most of the 19th Century, land rents were considered an ex-
ception to the general rule that, in competitive markets, prices would
coincide with the costs of production. Thus popular campaigns for land
reform attacked land rents on the basis that they were unearned and
inefficient, but typically left unchallenged the wider distributive results
of free market capitalism (e.g. George, 1935). But as Wickstead,
Wicksell, John Bates Clark and others recognised toward the end of the
nineteenth century, Ricardian land rents were just a special case of a
general principle (Blaug, 1997, p. 133): surplus payments accrue to the
more productive units of any factor that is not perfectly elastic in
supply.
These insights threw into question the moral legitimacy of capitalist
distribution. In response, John Bates Clark offered a new controversial
but influential defence for laissez-faire capitalism: ‘free competition
tends to give to labour what labour creates, to capitalists what capital
creates, and to entrepreneurs what the coordinating function creates’
(Clark, 1908 [1899], p. 3). As legal theorist Robert Hale remarked, “the
basis of distribution on this theory has shifted from the earlier basis of
‘sacrifice’ to that of ‘imputed productivity’, a basis which Clark ex-
pressly approves as ‘ethical’, but without any discussion of the ground”
(Hale, 1924, cited in Fried, 1998, p. 133).
Hale was part of a movement of social theorists and economists who
mobilised around a ‘rent theory Lockeanism’ (Fried, 1998, p. 75) to
challenge Clark's normative claims and press for redistribution and
economic reform in the late 19th and early 20th Century. Locke's fa-
mous declaration that ‘Labour being the unquestionable property of the
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to’
(Locke, 1823 [1669], p. 116) has been interpreted by many con-
servatives to justify a strong, laissez-faire, property rights regime. But
for Hale and his allies, rather than justifying entitlement to whatever
payment the market might deliver, Lockean theory suggested that
people are entitled only to that portion of revenue that compensates
them for their labour and sacrifice in the provision of goods and services.
The rent theory Lockeans (including American institutionalists,
British Fabian socialists and New Liberals) were spurred on by the
predictions of marginalist economics: that prices would tend to reflect
the costs of production only where supply was perfectly elastic, and in
all other cases, those in control of superior capabilities and assets would
receive a reward in excess of both expenditure and effort – variously
called ‘economic rent’, ‘unproductive surplus’, or ‘unearned increment’
(Fried, 1998, p. 25).
2.2. Defining rent, rent-seeking and rentier power
Building on this rent theory Lockeanism, I define rent as an eco-
nomic reward which is analogous to ground rent in the following two
ways: (1) it is sustained through control of assets that cannot be quickly
and widely replicated, and (2) it exceeds proportionate1 compensation
for the labour of the recipient.
Like many contemporary rent theorists, I use the term asset broadly
to include, for instance, brand recognition, bargaining powers, econo-
mies of scale, tacit knowledge, affective relations, art, protected in-
formation, techniques and processes (Andreucci et al., 2017; Birch,
2017; Bowman and Toms, 2010; Mihályi and Szelényi, 2016; Sørensen,
2000).
Rentier power is the power to extract rent, and rent-seeking is the
investment of time and resources in the pursuit of rents. Typically, rent-
seeking involves acquiring existing assets like land, patents or financial
assets (Hudson and Bezemer, 2012; Korinek, 2012; Ryan-Collins et al.,
2017), establishing private ownership titles over socio-ecological
commons (Andreucci et al., 2017), or constructing ‘isolating mechan-
isms’ to prevent the imitation of the valuable capabilities and resources
(Hoopes et al., 2003, p. 891).
Rentier power can be wielded by individuals, by whole social
classes2 (Keynes 2000 [1923]; Sørensen, 2000), and also by firms (on
behalf of individuals). However, profits accruing to firms cannot ac-
curately be categorised as rents or non-rents, because the definition
requires us to consider the labour of the individual. Only when (and if)
the profit translates into a reward for an individual, can we judge
whether or not it is a rent.
Rent will typically account for a large proportion of interest, divi-
dends, capital gains, ground rents and so on. But wages can also include
rents, where workers' remuneration is disproportionate to their labour
and is sustained by their own, or their firms', control over assets. Rents
extracted through the financial system, for instance, are often paid out
in the form of wages or bonuses (Lindley and Mcintosh, 2017).
An unearned income — that is, a reward exceeding proportionate
compensation for one's labour — can avoid the label ‘rent’ if it arises
because of an innovation or productivity improvement that can be
quickly and easily replicated or imitated by others. This replicability
should ensure that the surplus is relatively short-lived and the benefits
of the improvement are relatively3 widely shared.
As theorists from the field of management strategy recognise, firms
achieve sustained competitive advantage precisely by preventing such
replication: by building up resources and capabilities that are both
valuable and isolated from imitation or substitution (Hoopes et al.,
2003). According to the understanding of rent which I am advancing in
this article, a temporary innovation-induced surplus is transformed into
a rent to the extent that such barriers to replication exist.
1 The question of what reward is proportionate to labour can only be an-
swered through social deliberation, and comparison with rates of compensation
across society for work requiring a similar time commitment and degree of toil.
We cannot hope to answer the question with perfect accuracy and objectivity,
and attempting to do so would create an overbearing bureaucratic burden
(Wright, 2016). But where certain groups and professions enjoy remuneration
levels widely recognised as disproportionate to the time and effort expended,
this premium can serve as a prompt for civil society and government to in-
vestigate whether rentier power is involved.
2 Keynes (1923) defined rentiers as the ‘Investing Class’, as against the
‘Business Class’ and the ‘Earning Class’, noting that, ‘interest today rewards no
genuine sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land’ (Keynes 1936: 376, cited
in Seccareccia and Lavoie, 2016, p. 207). The concept of rentier in this paper is
therefore consistent with, but broader than, Keynes' own use of the terms.
3 The distribution of such temporary non-rents is still likely to systematically
under-reward workers whose bargaining power is weakened by their lack of
access to land, or other assets that could offer a route to subsistence or allow
them to raise finance for self-employment. See Section 4.2.1.
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2.3. Synergies and contrasts with other understandings of rent
The concept of a temporary innovation-induced surplus just dis-
cussed has similarities with the ‘rents’ that Schumpeter credited with
driving the capitalist process of technological progress (Schumpeter,
2017 [1911]), and with Marshall's concept of ‘quasi rents’ (Marshall,
1920). However, the nature of these surplus incomes is ambiguous in
both Schumpeter and Marshall's writing: Are they purely based on re-
plicable innovations, and thus genuinely transitory, or might they
sometimes be sustained by the presence of intellectual property, tacit
knowledge, privileged access to finance, or other sources of rentier
power? To avoid ambiguity I prefer to reserve the term rent for surplus
incomes that are protected from erosion through control over assets
that are inherently scarce or difficult to replicate.
The understanding of rent I deploy in this article builds implicitly on
Marx, who developed Ricardo's theory of rent in several important ways
(Harvey, 2018, chap. 11). Marx established, for instance, that variations
in natural fertility were not the only source of ground rent. Rather,
investments in the productive capacity of the land (a strategy for ac-
cumulation by expansion) could, under certain circumstances, become
the basis for a more or less permanent surplus, that could be appro-
priated by the landlord as rent (Marx, 1993 [1894], chaps. 40–44).
The understanding of rent I adopt in this paper is not consistent with
the neoclassical concept of rent. Most neoclassical textbook definitions
make no reference to control over scarce assets or to the unearned
nature of rents, but rather define a rent as an ‘income in excess of op-
portunity cost’ (McEachern, 2013, p. 244). According to this definition
most payments made to landowners for the use of land would not be
classed as rents. Significantly, the neoclassical understanding of rent
(and rent-seeking in particular) has been deployed to advocate for less
government intervention in the economy (e.g. Krueger, 1974). By
contrast, the early rent theorists that I draw upon in this article de-
veloped the concept of rent to challenge the logic of laissez faire eco-
nomics.
3. Why the concept of rent is important for ecological economics
3.1. Environmental protections and scarcity rents
Many ecological economists have made the case for hard limits on
resource use and waste emissions (Alcott, 2010; Kallis and Martinez-
Alier, 2010). This self-imposed scarcity could help mitigate ecological
collapse and prevent even greater, possibly irreversible, scarcity in the
future. Nevertheless, an increased scarcity of goods allocated by the
market could, ceteris paribus, mean higher prices and a greater oppor-
tunity for rent capture.4 It is incumbent upon ecological economists to
consider who will be in a position to capture those rents, and on whom
the burden will fall (Boyce, 2016, 2018; Farley et al., 2015; Felli, 2014;
Fuss et al., 2016; Kornek et al., 2017; Segal, 2012). In the early rounds
of the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme, for example, permits to emit
carbon dioxide were gifted to companies on the basis of their historical
emissions, meaning that the scarcity rents arising from the (weak)
emissions cap were captured by many of the largest corporate polluters,
whilst costs were passed onto citizens, with the poorest shouldering the
largest burden (Cornerhouse, 2013; Keppler and Cruciani, 2010; Spash,
2010). By contrast, designing our system of caps and environmental
protections so that unearned scarcity rents are redistributed — either as
a dividend or as free entitlements to energy, transport and other basic
services — could be emancipatory for the poor, and help build popular
support for the gradual tightening of those caps.
3.2. Could resource caps lead to intensified rent-seeking?
The link between resource scarcity and rent extraction has been
widely discussed. But there is a more subtle and pervasive way in which
environmental protections could trigger a mobilisation of rentier
power.
The argument I make in this section builds on the substantial vo-
lume of literature in ecological economics that suggests that limits on
resource throughput will constrain consumption and production
(D'Alisa et al., 2014; Daly, 1996; Dietz and O'Neill, 2013; Jackson,
2009; Kallis, 2011; Meadows et al., 1972; Victor, 2008). Although it
may be possible for the state to shape the direction of the economy,
such that growth in particular sectors can be ‘decoupled’ from en-
vironmental impact for limited periods of time (e.g. Mazzucato and
Perez, 2014), the balance of evidence suggests that the rates of growth
we are accustomed to for the economy as a whole cannot be sustained
whilst also respecting planetary boundaries (Hickel and Kallis, 2019;
Parrique et al., 2019). As such, it is essential for society to anticipate the
possible macroeconomic and distributional impacts of low, zero and
negative growth rates.
Of particular concern here is the fact that the closer we get to zero
growth in production and consumption, the closer we get to a zero sum
game where consumption gains for one person require consumption
losses for another, in absolute and not just relative terms. In an
economy that is flatlining in GDP terms, if incomes rise for one group in
society, this expansion must be mirrored by a contraction of incomes
elsewhere in the economy.
Broadly speaking there are two ways of increasing one's income.
The first is to expand one's output, either by working harder, or by
improving productivity. The second is to make a more powerful claim
over the existing output of the economy. If opportunities for expanding
production become more limited due to environmental protections,
those seeking to increase their income and wealth may be tempted to
pursue the second approach: to make more powerful claims over the
spoils from existing production. For those in positions of power this is
likely to mean extending and exploiting control over scarce and irre-
plicable assets. In other words, if resource constraints hamper accu-
mulation through expanded production we may see a trend toward land
and resource grabbing, intensified exploitation of workers, financial
speculation, aggressive use of intellectual property and monopoly
powers to block competition, and pressure to privatize public infra-
structures and commons. Such a shift in investment would represent an
intensification of a pattern that has been underway for decades, and
which many Marxists consider a response to capitalist crises of over-
accumulation and under-consumption (e.g. Bellamy Foster and
Magdoff, 2014; Harvey, 1985; Streeck, 2016). In short, if ecological
limits (self-imposed or exogenously imposed) make it difficult to grow
output, rent-seeking is likely to intensify, unless deliberate steps are
taken to close rent-extractive opportunities.
How concerned should ecological economists be about a continua-
tion, or intensification, of rent-seeking in a resource-constrained future?
Below I highlight three relatively straightforward ways that opportu-
nities for rent extraction pose a threat to ecological economists' as-
piration to ‘live well within limits’ (O'Neill et al., 2018; Raworth, 2017).
Section 4 will then build on this analysis to consider the more complex
and paradoxical relationship between rent extraction and growth.
3.3. Rent extraction further impoverishes the poorest
Where rent-seeking is successful, the rewards for rentiers inevitably
come at the expense of those with less power (Sørensen, 2000) – be they
workers, suppliers, debtors, customers, tenants or citizens. For instance,
rent-seeking through privatised public infrastructures has frequently
resulted in rising prices for services like water (Bayliss and Hall, 2017;
Chong et al., 2006), transport (Blanc-Brude et al., 2006) and tele-
communications (Stryszowska, 2012). Rent extraction through the
4 In some cases substitution effects could reduce the scope for private rent
capture over the longer term. For example, carbon caps could encourage the
emergence of new electricity generation technologies that are less easily subject
to monopoly control.
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housing market comes directly at the expense of those who do not in-
herit housing wealth (Clarke et al., 2016; D'Arcy and Gardiner, 2017;
Stephens et al., 2014). Rising costs for essentials like housing, energy,
transport and communication costs hit the poorest hardest, eating up a
larger share of their income (Gough et al., 2011).
3.4. Debt-fuelled rent-seeking can lead to financial crisis
The interaction of rent-seeking with our debt-based monetary
system and the Too-Big-To-Fail limited liability model of banking poses
a second threat to ecological economists' goal of going ‘slower by de-
sign, not disaster’ (Victor, 2008). When a bank creates a loan it creates
new money, adding to aggregate purchasing power (McLeay et al.,
2014). When this expanded purchasing power fuels a bidding war for
existing assets, such as houses, the result tends to be asset price inflation
(Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). Without effective taxation and regulation,
this asset price inflation can activate a feedback loop between the be-
haviour of banks and the rent-seeking of borrowers and investors,
seeking to make capital gains (Fig. 1a).
In the UK, for instance, the treatment of homes and land as a source
of unearned income/wealth (via both capital gains and rental income),
and the availability of cheap mortgage debt to support this rent-
seeking, has been a major driver of house price inflation (Green and
Bentley, 2014; Ryan-Collins et al., 2017; Saunders, 2016; Seabrooke
and Schwartz, 2009).
Such debt- and rentier-fuelled feedback loops can easily slip into
reverse if anything occurs to shake the confidence of banks and in-
vestors (Fig. 1b). Asset prices can thus collapse suddenly, pushing
businesses and banks toward insolvency and households toward nega-
tive equity. These reversible feedback loops explain the strong em-
pirical link between rapid credit creation (particularly for real estate)
and the onset of financial crisis (Alessi and Detken, 2011; Borio, 2014;
Scatigna et al., 2014). Such macroeconomic consequences are in-
compatible with the goal of delivering wellbeing within ecological
limits since the periods of economic insecurity and contraction which
tend to follow financial crises are associated with significant losses in
well-being (Easterlin et al., 2010; Fanning and O'Neill, 2019).
3.5. Rent-seeking is an inefficient use of time and resources
An efficient economy, from an ecological perspective, is one that
meets human needs, and supports human flourishing, with the lowest
ecological cost (O'Neill et al., 2018). In addition to social changes,
achieving this kind of efficiency is likely to require significant invest-
ment in both resource-efficiency and labour-saving innovation. A
discerning approach to such innovation is warranted, given their his-
torical association with expansions in consumption (Alcott, 2005;
Sorrell et al., 2007), deteriorations in the quality of goods and services
and – certainly in the case of many labour saving innovations – losses in
job satisfaction. However, when deployed in the context of tough re-
source caps and diffuse rentier power, labour-saving technologies have
the potential to liberate us to spend time in democratic dialogue, caring
for one another, repairing our damaged ecosystems, and simply en-
joying ourselves. And without investment in both labour saving and
resource efficient innovations, caps on fossil fuels and other resources
could make us more reliant on human labour to meet basic human
needs than we have been for decades (Sorman and Giampietro, 2011).
Rent-seeking obstructs investment for such socially useful purposes.
It channels resources and time into costly legal battles over intellectual
property that can actually slow the emergence and spread of innovation
(Bessen and Meurer, 2008; UNCTAD, 2017). It leads companies to
spend more on share buybacks than they do on research and develop-
ment (Lazonick et al., 2013). It inspires tunnelling through the Penn-
sylvanian mountains to lay fibre optic cables that will give three mil-
liseconds of advantage to high frequency traders (Krugman, 2017). It is
hard to think of more profoundly wasteful uses of human time and
planetary resources.
4. The paradoxical relationship between rent and growth
One possible explanation for ecological economists' neglect of the
phenomena of rents may be that reducing rent-seeking and rent ex-
traction is often framed as a strategy for achieving higher or more
consistent economic growth (Baumol, 1996; Ricardo, 1817, 2001; van
der Ploeg, 2011), which, as noted already, many ecological economists
consider incompatible with ecological sustainability. In Section 4.1, I
highlight three key ways in which closing opportunities for rent ex-
traction could indeed boost production and consumption, before
turning to explain (in Section 4.2) why I believe, paradoxically, closing
opportunities for rent extraction is an essential precondition for ending
our systemic dependency on growth.
4.1. Opportunities for rent extraction hamper growth
First, rent extraction can dampen growth by squeezing consumption
demand. As noted in Section 3.3, the burden of rent extraction tends to
fall on the poorest, who have the highest propensity to consume out of
their income (Hartwig, 2014; Onaran and Galanis, 2012). Of course,
rentiers are also consumers, so rewards for rentiers do recirculate
eventually. But rentiers have a greater propensity to leave their income
Fig. 1. Feedbacks pushing house prices up (a) and down (b).
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sitting idly in a bank account or to move it into the FIRE sector (finance,
insurance and real estate), thus contributing to deficient demand in the
rest of the economy. A gap thus opens up between the wages put into
circulation, and the money values to be realised in the market through
higher prices (Klitgaard and Krall, 2012). Closing the most flagrant
opportunities for rent extraction could therefore help demand to keep
pace with productive capacity.
Second, if the surplus that is currently channelled into socially
useless rent-seeking were redirected into productivity improvements,
the likely result would be growth, unless resource caps were in place to
prevent such an outcome. As many ecological economists have ob-
served, labour saving and resource efficient innovations often lead to
economic savings and lower prices, and thus act as an overall stimulus
to consumption (Alcott, 2005; Ayres and Warr, 2005, 2009; Sorrell
et al., 2007).
Third, as noted in Section 3.4, where rent-seeking interacts with our
poorly regulated debt-based monetary system, it can result in violent
asset price booms and busts, which create the conditions for a balance
sheet recession (Koo, 2003). Closing opportunities for rent extraction
through our financial and housing systems would reduce or eliminate
such recessions.
4.2. Should we thank rentiers as unlikely environmental saviours?
If rent-seeking and rent extraction tend to suppress production and
consumption in the ways outlined above should we thank rentiers as
unlikely environmental saviours? I believe that ecological economists
must be vehement in their rejection of this logic, for two reasons.
First, ecological economists often point out that those who celebrate
anything that promotes growth, regardless of its social consequences,
are confusing means with ends (Daly, 1973; Daly and Farley, 2011,
chap. 3). It follows that to celebrate anything that curtails growth, is to
be guilty of the same fallacy. The challenge that we face is not just
reducing aggregate material consumption to a level that is within pla-
netary boundaries, but doing so in a way that creates opportunities for
all to flourish (Jackson, 2009; O'Neill et al., 2018; Raworth, 2017). The
mechanisms by which rent-seeking and rent extraction dampen re-
source consumption are unhelpful, and sometimes extremely damaging,
from the point of view of this goal.
Second, the relationship between rent and resource throughput is
far more complex than immediately meets the eye. In fact, I propose
that the distributional and macroeconomic consequences of con-
centrated rentier power and rent-seeking constitute a ‘political growth
imperative’ (Richters and Siemoneit, 2019). In other words, con-
centrations of rentier power and rent-seeking create the conditions
under which politicians feel compelled to pursue growth-oriented po-
licies, regardless of their environmental consequences. I highlight here
three mechanisms at play within this rentier growth imperative.
4.2.1. Concentrated rentier power makes growth necessary to maintain
employment
The first form of growth dependency emerges out of the interaction
of labour productivity improvements with the unequal distribution of
land and other rent-bearing assets. Automation, mechanisation,
economies of scale and so on reduce the need for labour in the pro-
duction process. In a growing economy, surplus labour can be quickly
reabsorbed to produce more units of output. But in the absence of
growth, labour saving innovations threaten to cause rising unemploy-
ment. The solution embraced by many ecological economists is to use
labour productivity improvements to reduce and redistribute working
hours (Victor, 2008; Coote et al. 2010).
But this strategy is unlikely to succeed unless the benefits of pro-
ductivity improvements are shared with ordinary workers, rather than
captured wholly or largely by managers, shareholders, landowners and
so on. In this latter case, the hourly pay of ordinary workers is likely to
stagnate, even as productivity rises, such that a reduction in working
hours implies a pay cut. One of the things that gives shareholders and
senior managers the power to suppress wages, as Marx recognised, is
the unequal control over land and other rent-bearing assets: people
dispossessed of land and other scarce assets that would offer a route to
subsistence or self-employment are effectively dependent for a liveli-
hood upon the sale of labour-power for a wage, and thus in a weak
bargaining position (Dobb, 1973, p. 151; Harvey, 2018, p. 359).
Even in contexts where firm managers and shareholders do not
exploit their workers — in worker-owned firms, for instance — many
workers are not inclined to choose part-time work because of the fi-
nancial and cultural pressures they themselves are under from rentiers
elsewhere in the economy. There is evidence, for instance, from Canada
(Fortin, 1995), Italy (Del Boca and Lusardi, 2003) and the UK (Bottazzi
et al., 2007), that the pressure to keep up with mortgage payments is
compelling households to devote more hours to paid work than they
might otherwise choose.
In short, the unequal distribution of rentier power stands in the way
of work-sharing, and therefore lies at the heart of the problem of so-
called ‘technological unemployment’. The hopeful flipside of this ana-
lysis is that diffusing rentier power could facilitate the reduction and
redistribution of working hours (Section 6.3).
4.2.2. Rent extraction drives poverty
A second and related form of growth dependency arises out of the
tendency for rent extraction to happen at the expense of the poorest. If
governments wish to address relative and/or absolute poverty, but are
unwilling or unable to challenge rentier power, growth promises a less
politically conflictual route than redistribution. Expansions of output
can function to mask the exploitation arising from rent extraction, or at
least to cushion non-rentiers from its full force. To use the classic pie
metaphor, if some individuals at the table use their accumulating
rentier power to demand a larger slice of the pie at every meal, the
slices of pie available to the rest will shrink to crumbs, unless the pie
itself grows. Growth in economic output does not address the under-
lying injustice of rent extraction, but it can alleviate distributional
conflict, and prevent absolute declines in material living standards.5
The promise that growth will reduce relative and/or absolute pov-
erty is most likely to be delivered if the rate of growth is higher than the
rate of rent extraction. This point is similar to Piketty's observation that
if the rate of return on wealth6 (r) is higher than the rate of growth of
average incomes (g), inequality will tend to increase (Piketty, 2014).
Although aspects of Piketty's theoretical work have come under justi-
fied criticism (e.g. Galbraith, 2014; Moseley, 2015; Seccareccia and
Lavoie, 2016; Varoufakis, 2014), this core claim is difficult to refute
(see Appendix 1). Piketty's thesis thus raises a challenging question for
ecological economists, which has not been satisfactorily answered to
date: how are we to ensure that r remains below g, if we anticipate
resource caps forcing g toward zero?
The only studies in ecological economics to directly address
Piketty's thesis are two articles by Jackson and Victor (2016, 2018)
which use stock-flow-consistent models to explore how rewards from
the productive process might be divided between capital and labour as
growth slows. The models suggest that the propensity for r to exceed g
will be greater in contexts where workers can be easily replaced with
built machines. This is a prescient point given trends toward automa-
tion (Brynjolfsson and Mcafee, 2014; Frey and Osborne, 2017). It is also
5 It is worth noting that for many aspects of well-being it is relative, not ab-
solute poverty that matters.
6 Piketty uses ‘the words capital and wealth interchangeably, as if they were
perfectly synonymous’ (Piketty, 2014:47) even though they have distinct
meanings in most schools of economic thought. Piketty's returns to wealth are
not perfectly synonymous with rents, due not least to the presence of rents in
wages. Nevertheless a large proportion of rents do take the form of dividends,
interest, rental income, and so on measured by Piketty.
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a finding which fits neatly with the thesis presented in the present ar-
ticle, since in reality the power of capital to dispense with workers,
and/or exclude them from sharing in the benefits of technological im-
provements, is itself shaped by the distribution of rent-bearing assets.
However, the models do not allow for an explicit manipulation of
rentier power, or of rent-seeking through financial speculation, real
estate investment, monopoly power or control of finite natural re-
sources. The authors call for further analysis of structural features
which might enable agents to extort more than their ‘fair’ share of the
output from production (Jackson and Victor, 2016, p. 209), and this is
something I intend to offer in a forthcoming article.
4.2.3. Post-bubble debt build-ups cannot be paid down without growth
A third form of growth dependency emerges out of the dynamics
discussed in Section 3.4 — that is, the tendency for debt-fuelled rent-
seeking to lead to asset price booms and busts, which leave in their
wake very high debt-to-GDP ratios.
A high debt-to-GDP ratio creates a political growth imperative be-
cause reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio (whether public or private debt) is
extremely challenging in the absence of GDP growth, and without re-
course to unorthodox and controversial interventions such as debt
cancellation and/or extensive monetary financing by the central bank
(Keen, 2017; Turner, 2015). Efforts by the private sector (households
and businesses) to repay debts without taking on new loans can cause
the economy to shrink and thereby worsen the debt ratio (Boait and
Hodgson, 2018, p. 47; Koo, 2003). Further problems are attached to the
use of fiscal austerity to pay down public debt. When governments cut
back on spending in an effort to run a budget surplus, the result tends
not only to be contraction of private domestic demand and GDP, which
can result in a worsening debt-to-GDP ratio (Guajardo et al., 2011), but
also rising inequality and poverty (Ball et al., 2013). Inflation can help
to reduce the burden of both public and private debt, but – in the ab-
sence of growth – there are limits to the efficacy of this strategy, as
buyers of government debt will demand ever-higher nominal interest
rates to compensate for the additional inflation they expect (Boait and
Hodgson, 2018, p. 44).
By far the most effective and least controversial way to improve the
debt-to-GDP ratio is a government stimulus aimed at boosting economic
output. Thus, debt- and rentier-fuelled asset price bubbles, by in-
creasing the debt-to-GDP ratio, tend to necessitate political interven-
tions to support productive investment and/or prop up consumption
demand.
5. Implications for designing our socio-ecological transition
I have proposed three interrelated forms of ‘rentier growth im-
perative’ which mean that, when environmental protections come into
conflict with growth, policy makers are likely to feel compelled to
prioritise growth, in order to manage levels of debt, unemployment and
poverty. To end this growth-at-any-cost mentality, we must diffuse
rentier power, discourage rent-seeking and redistribute rents.
I have also shown that it is important that measures to close op-
portunities for rent extraction go hand in hand with tough resource caps
and environmental protections. This is because closing down opportu-
nities for rent extraction could, at least in the short term, stimulate
productive investment and boost demand, leading to higher levels of
resource consumption and waste emissions (Section 4.1). If tough re-
source caps and environmental protections are in place, however, then
a reallocation of funding from rent-seeking to productivity improve-
ments need not be a threat to the ecosystem. It is the combination of
pre-emptive environmental protections alongside checks on rentier
power that will allow our economy to ‘go slower by design, not disaster’
(Victor, 2008).
Fig. 2 summarises this thesis, mapping different economic systems
— historical, contemporary and potential — onto two axes: the degree
to which rentier power is kept in check, and the degree to which
resource use is constrained.
The option of staying in the non-resource-constrained space (above
the horizontal axis in Fig. 2) is no longer open to us, at least not in the
long run. Growth in resource throughput can only be enjoyed tem-
porarily, by appropriating ecological space that people elsewhere in the
world and/or future generations need to meet their basic needs. By
focussing on the case for environmental protections but neglecting to
formulate proposals for reining in rentier power, the environmental
movement risks setting us onto a trajectory toward the bottom left
quadrant, for the reasons discussed in Sections 3 and 4, and summarised
in Fig. 3.
Implementing fossil fuel caps/taxes and other environmental pro-
tections could lead to higher prices and lower demand in many in-
dustries in the real economy. If profits become difficult to make by
expanding production, profit seeking strategies could shift toward
claiming an increasing share of the rewards from existing production (Fig. 3,
a–h) unless deliberate steps are taken to prevent this outcome. As noted
in Section 3.2, this shift is likely to manifest itself in more speculation in
finance and real estate, more aggressive use of intellectual property and
monopoly powers to block competition, greater exploitation of workers
and/or offshoring of production, and more pressure to privatize public
infrastructures and commons.
A continuation or intensification of such rent-seeking strategies is
likely to inflate prices for housing, energy and other essentials, cause
wages to lose their purchasing power, fuel asset price booms and busts,
and slow the emergence and spread of innovations that could help us to
adapt to resource constraints (Fig. 3, i–n). Unless society can identify
the real culprit for the resultant inequality and economic insecurity, it is
likely that the finger will be pointed at environmental protections, and
pressure will build for their abandonment (Fig. 3, o–p).
Ensuring that caps on resource use go explicitly hand in hand with
measures to redistribute rents and rentier power is thus not only a
moral responsibility for environmentalists, but a question of political
realism. If we are to have any hope of mobilizing a ‘comprehensive
coalition of social forces’ (Buch-Hansen, 2018) in support of environ-
mental protections, the protections must come as part of a package of
reforms that are more attractive and emancipatory for ordinary asset-
poor citizens than the (illusory) promise of growth, full employment
and cheaper consumer goods (Barca, 2017; Pineault, 2018). I turn now
to consider what that package of reforms might consist of and how it
might best be framed and justified.
6. Redistribution versus structural change
The solutions most commonly offered by ecological economists to
the threat of rising inequality in a post-growth economy are the pro-
posals for minimum and maximum incomes, and a wealth cap
(Alexander, 2014; Buch-Hansen and Koch, 2019; Cosme et al., 2017;
Daly, 1977). At first glance, these proposals would seem to have the
attraction of simplicity on their side, requiring only a handful of policy
changes rather than scores of separate policies to transform the many
different institutions from which rentier power flows.
The standard proposal is that the caps on income and wealth would
be operationalised through 100% tax rates on the highest marginal tax
band (Daly, 1977, p. 56): any income or wealth exceeding a certain
level would be entirely taxed away. Daly's proposal for a minimum
income is similar to the proposal for a Universal Basic Income which is
often presented as a solution to automation-induced unemployment
(e.g. Srnicek and Williams, 2015). Daly has argued that such policies
would be perfectly compatible with a ‘free market’ approach to eco-
nomic policy, allowing us to do away with ‘blundering interference
with the price system’ such as rent controls, minimum wages, and la-
bour unions (Daly, 1977, pp. 54–6). This is a stance that we see echoed
by contemporary libertarian supporters of the basic income (Clarke,
2018; Young, 2017), and which I propose is misguided.
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6.1. Minimum and maximum incomes: potential limitations
A key problem with relying on a basic income to address inequality
is that putting more purchasing power in the pockets of ordinary
people, without challenging wider imbalances of power in the
economy, is likely to empower rentiers to raise prices and lower wages.
Such an effect is visible in the UK housing market, where payments of
housing benefit — although beneficial for tenants — have also enabled
landlords to raise rents above the level that people would otherwise be
able to afford (Gibbons and Manning, 2006).
Similarly, caps on individual income and wealth leave unchecked
the rentier power of corporate entities. One of the widely acknowledged
features of capitalist market exchange is that the winners in ‘round one’
are at an advantage in subsequent rounds (Lawn, 2011, p. 8), benefit-
ting from economies of scale, network effects, brand recognition, bar-
gaining powers vis-à-vis tax authorities, retailers and suppliers, and
many other assets that cannot be easily replicated by smaller players
and new entrants. The result is steady consolidation of corporate power
– a trend that has been documented over the past two decades at both
national (EIG, 2017; Foster et al., 2011; Grullon et al., 2017) and in-
ternational levels (UNCTAD, 2017, pp. 126–7). Such accumulating
corporate power is a threat to democracy and a particular threat to
enactment of tough environmental protections and high marginal tax
rates (Chomsky, 2017; Klein, 2015; Moe, 2010; Monbiot, 2001).
Further, in any society where political leaders can be voted out of
power, a policy of minimum and maximum incomes will only be robust
if it has popular legitimacy, and that requires a set of supportive in-
stitutions and cultural narratives very different to those that pertain
today. It is tempting to see caps on income and wealth as a silver bullet
for limiting inequality, just as caps on resource use are sometimes
imagined to be a silver bullet for dealing with ecological challenges. But
a cap on fossil fuel use will be vulnerable to opposition if it raises prices
to the point where significant sections of the population cannot afford
transportation to get to work or energy to heat their homes. Likewise, a
cap on wealth and income will be vulnerable to opposition if the market
systematically delivers pre-tax incomes in excess of the cap to sig-
nificant sections of the population, and if these incomes are portrayed
in popular discourse as being aligned with and justified by the ‘pro-
ductivity’ of the recipient.
In short, if the wider system remains as it is, straining in the op-
posite direction, then wealth and income caps, and/or a basic income,
may be ineffective and short-lived, if enacted at all.
6.2. The concept of rent in democratic persuasion
The constructive message of this article is that the concept of rent
could be a useful discursive frame to help build popular support for
overhauling our economic institutions, so that there is far less work for
redistributive taxes to do. A campaign against the injustice and in-
efficiency of specific kinds of rent extraction could, I propose, be more
effective than a simple appeal for limits on inequality. As Varoufakis
(2002, p. 459) argues, it is a typical weakness of discourse on the po-
litical left to discuss inequality as if it were ‘uniform in quality and
variable only in quantity’, and that there is some ‘optimum’ quantity to
aim for. Herman Daly, for example, writes:
‘The goal of total equality can become a pathological quest for a
jealous homogeneity at the lowest common denominator... To avoid
the absurdities of too much equality as well as too much inequality,
we should think in terms of limits to inequality; of a range within
which inequality is necessary, efficient, and just, and beyond which it
Fig. 2. Four different economy ‘types’ mapped onto two intersecting axes: degree of resource constraints and concentration of rentier power.
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is unnecessary, inefficient and unjust.’ (Daly, 1977, p. 81, my italics)
Surely any judgement about whether inequality is ‘necessary, effi-
cient and just’ requires an examination of the process by which it has
come about (Varoufakis, 2002). The concept of rent can be a helpful
guide as we make that examination, helping to undermine two typical
defences for unearned income.
The first defence, articulated by Nozick (1974), is that the rich are
entitled to their wealth as long as the contracts and transactions un-
derlying that wealth are voluntary. But as Macpherson (1973) and Sen
(2001) have eloquently argued, freedom of choice is only meaningful if
one has a sufficient breadth of feasible alternative options. If your next
best opportunity is seriously unattractive, then you do not have a
meaningful free choice. The power to extract rent is inextricably tied to
imbalances in ‘opportunity cost’, which is really about a relative lack of
freedom for some people. MacPherson in particular recasts freedom as
freedom from the systematic extractive power of otherssystematic ex-
tractive power of others, and freedom to develop one's capacities
(Varoufakis, 2002, p. 468). When we think of freedom in this way, it is
quite clear that a rentier ‘monopoly of productive resources by one
social class makes freedom impossible for the many’ (ibid, p. 471).
The second justification for unearned income, articulated by John
Bates Clark (1908 [1899]), is the notion that the market will tend to
reward factors of production according to their contribution to pro-
ductivity or value creation. This assumption is still implicit in the
mainstream approach to calculating the productivity of, or value added
by, a firm or a workforce – an approach that ignores the role of relative
scarcity in determining prices. The concept of rent, by contrast, en-
courages us to distinguish those individuals and firms making a genuine
contribution through replicable innovations, whose benefits can be
broadly shared, from those benefiting from monopolistic control over
assets, and ‘barriers to imitation’, which prevent the spread of pro-
ductivity enhancing innovation.
The concept of rent allows for a campaign narrative aligned with,
rather than working in opposition to, the deeply held cultural belief
that people should contribute to society, if they can, rather than de-
pending on the labour of others. Currently this powerful belief system is
harnessed by right-wing politicians and commentators to demonise the
most marginalised in society, those dependent on welfare payments to
survive (e.g. Mason, 2013). The concepts of rent and rentier power offer
us the opportunity to highlight the real ‘free riders’.
6.3. The policy development challenge
Moving from delegitimising rentier power to diffusing it will not
necessarily be easy. To date my own research has focussed on rent
extraction through the British land and housing system, and particu-
larly the challenge of reducing and socialising land rents without trig-
gering a crash in house prices, which would bring its own social,
Fig. 3. Feedbacks under conditions of resource constraints and concentrated rentier power.
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political and macroeconomic problems (Stratford and McCann, 2019).
My proposed solutions to this conundrum are set out in a co-authored
report on land reform for the UK Labour Party (Monbiot et al., 2019).
Knowing the complexities involved in this one policy area makes me
reticent to offer quick prescriptions for financial rents, monopoly rents,
resource rents, advertising rents, managerial rents and so on, which will
each raise their own peculiar questions. For instance, if we reduce the
rent-extractive power provided by the intellectual property regime, and
rely on public institutions to play a greater role in funding and de-
risking innovations (Mazzucato, 2013), how ought the power to direct
such public support be diffused and democratised? How can we break
the monopolistic power of the digital giants like Facebook and Google,
whose surveillance-and-manipulation business model is undermining
democracy itself (Hind, 2019)? Should the rents arising from our
common resources be redistributed through equal per capita dividends
as some propose (Boyce, 2016; Chamberlin et al., 2015), or in the form
of free entitlements to transport, housing, energy, healthcare, education
and food (Coote et al., 2019)? How can we protect our economy against
the risks of capital flight and the offshoring of jobs as we reduce the
extractive power of financiers and empower workers (Berry and
Guinan, 2019)?
It will not be possible to entirely eliminate rents. But structural
changes that reduce opportunities for rent extraction and redistribute
unavoidable rents could radically reduce the strain to be taken by re-
distributive taxation, lower the risk of asset price bubbles, and – criti-
cally – facilitate a key plank in the socio-ecological transition: the re-
duction of working hours. If our anti-monopoly policies are successful,
then no single firm would have the power to extract rents through
control of technology or data. If firms were mutually owned and de-
mocratically managed, workers' hourly remuneration would be more
likely to rise in line with productivity improvements. And with a
‘Common Wealth Dividend’ and/or Universal Basic Services (Coote
et al., 2019) people would have a route to subsistence and security
without selling their labour. Such structural shifts would make workers
both more inclined and more empowered to negotiate reduced working
hours.
7. Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to highlight three inter-
connected blindspots in ecological economics: the threat of intensified
rent-seeking in a resource-constrained future, the roles that rent-
seeking and concentrated rentier power play in our growth de-
pendency, and the opportunities that may flow from mobilizing around
the concept of rent.
The paradox in the relationship between rent and growth that I have
highlighted has important implications for the success or failure of
different strategies for socio-ecological transition. I have argued that
reining in rentier power is a pre-condition for imposing tough limits on
resource use without social damage, and tough limits on resource use
and waste emissions are a precondition for reining in rent extraction
without environmental damage. If the checks on rentier power and
resource caps go together, there need be no trade-off between meeting
the needs of all today, and ensuring the planet is in a fit state to support
the needs of tomorrow.
The final hopeful message of this article is that the concepts of rent
and rent-seeking may offer a powerful discursive frame for delegiti-
mizing incomes which are neither earned, in the sense of being pro-
portionate to labour, nor socially useful, in the sense of stimulating
innovations whose benefits are broadly shared. Thus, these concepts
may help to build the popular and political support that is needed to
transform our economic institutions so that they can support a good life
for all within planetary boundaries.
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Appendix 1
Piketty famously observed that if the rate of return on wealth (r) is
higher than the rate of growth of average incomes (g), inequality will
tend to increase (Piketty, 2014). In this Appendix 1 show why this
observation is difficult to refute.
One way of measuring income inequality is to look at the income of
a rich subset (the top 1%, or 10% or 20%) and express it as a multiple of
the average income. If the income of some rich subset is growing at a
faster rate than the average person's income, then income inequality






> 1, then in-
equality will increase.
Let us imagine, for simplicity, that the richest percentiles of society
live entirely on passive returns on their wealth, and do not receive any
income from labour whatsoever. In that case, their income is given
simply by rW, and the rate of increase of their income is simply rs,
where s is the proportion of their income which is saved/reinvested.









% . It is clear from this equation that if r > g and if





> 1, and we can expect inequality to grow over the long
term.7
We know both that marginal propensities to save increase as in-
comes increase (Brown, 2004; Hartwig, 2014; Onaran and Galanis,
2012) and that returns to wealth tend to be higher the more wealth you
have to invest (Piketty, 2014, pp. 447–52). Thus, if r is higher than g it
is very likely that rR (the rate of return on wealth for the richest sections
of the population) will be significantly higher than g and that there will
be members of the richest income percentiles who do have a savings
rate s higher than g
r R
, meaning that inequality will increase.
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